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There were explicit directives and implicit assumptions in the direct
controls authority provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950' for
the wedding of price and wage controls. This was established through
the simple expedient of providing an independent Economic Stabilization
Agency to administer and enforce both price and wage controls. Congress
directed that there be "connubial bliss" partially through requiring that
price and wage controls be instituted concurrently and partially through
the recognition and declaration that the price and wage programs must
be compatible for a fair and equitable stabilization program. The task of
the Economic Stabilization Administrator was to effect this compatibility.
There must be a clearer understanding of what the problem of price-
wage coordination is and, perhaps more importantly, what the problem is
not. The factors affecting and determining the course of the two inter-
related programs, and the degree to which these affecting factors can
and need be influenced by administrative action, must be understood.
Furthermore, it must then be possible to delineate the areas in which the
price and wage programs interrelate in order to define more accurately
that which is being called a problem-i.e., those parts or aspects of the
program which can and need be integrated and made more compatible, in
policy or action, so that there can be more nearly an achievement of the
goal of equitable economic stabilization.
t A.B., Swarthmore College, 1940; M.P.A. Harvard University, 1947; Ph.D., Harvard
University, 1953; formerly, economist, Office of Economic Advisor, Economic Stabiliza-
tion Agency, 1950-1953; previously, economist with National Security Resources Board,
Gordon Gray Report on Foreign Economic Policies, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor; currently, economic consultant, Washington, D. C. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of
any government agencies with which the author has been associated.
1. 64 STAT. 798 (1950); 50 U.S.C. §2061 (Supp. 1952). All section references
herein will be to this Act unless otherwise indicated.
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The problem of price and wage program coordination, therefore,
can be stated as one of establishing and maintaining price and wage pro-
grams for an emergency which are mutually compatible, jointly contribute
to the objectives of stabilization, and do not obstruct the production and
resource-allocation program for defense.
While the size, type, and source of the inflationary pressures in an
emergency may vary, these same objectives are sought. With the varia-
tion in the intensity of emergency inflationary pressure, the timing and
type of economic controls need be adjusted.
In World War II the diversion of productive resources from normal
peacetime objectives to those of rapidly building up defenses forced the
economy of the United States into a disequilibrium. There was an ex-
pansion of production and employment and a diversion of resources into
nonconsumable products. Purchasing power was expanded, and at the
same time there was a decrease, either absolutely or proportionately, in
the goods and services which this purchasing power could buy. While
this inflationary gap (the difference between the generated disposable
personal income and the goods and services available for consumption at
current prices) was decreased, it was not possible to close it through
taxes and savings. However, even if this inflationary gap could be closed,
and this certainly has been attempted through tax, fiscal, monetary, and
credit means, the problem would not be solved. Liquid assets in various
forms or savings from past periods back up the newly enlarged purchasing
power and can be applied to bid for the restricted materials, goods, and
services. This makes the economy even more unstable as anticipated price
increases and anticipated shortages tempt purchasers to scramble for
goods, utilizing accumulated savings from the past. Thus, there can be
a strong psychological inflationary pull before the actual expenditures
from the enlarged defense program are felt. This occurred in 1950.
If the use of direct price and wage controls in serious emergency
circumstances should be foregone, prices and wages would rise to ever
higher "equilibrium" points, the costs of the defense effort would rise,
defense production would be hampered, and the burden of the defense
effort would fall upon those unable to raise their prices or wages or in-
come in relation to the inflationary spiral. Some segments of the economy
would benefit handsomely, at the expense of others, while making no
added contribution to the defense effort.
This, in most abbreviated form, is the rationale of direct price and
wage control in a defense or war economy. While there was neither a
full war economy nor a full defense economy in 1950-1953, price and
wage controls were used, and an attempt was made to adapt them to the
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types of inflationary pressures which the cold war brought forth. The
government looked to the direct price and wage controls, in addition to
the other so-called indirect controls, as a means to halt or slow the in-
flationary spiral. While the inflationary pressures in 1950-1953 differed
from those in World War II, many of the same control techniques were
employed, and there was an attempt to devise the most appropriate strategy
for their effective use to achieve stabilization objectives.
Basically, the objective of a direct price and wage program in an
emergency is to maintain the most stable relationship possible among
prices, as well as between prices and wages, assuring that the burdens of
the defense program will not fall inequitably on any segment of the
population and that distortions in prices and wages will not interfere
with production objectives.
Specifically, the objectives of an emergency price program are to
(a) maintain price levels and relationships for more stable costs to con-
sumers and industries, (b) assure purchasers of future price stability,
(c) maintain fair and equitable prices so as not to discourage or otherwise
distort the defense production program, and (d) protect the pattern
of trade, both domestic and foreign, from unstabilizing disturbances. The
objectives of an emergency wage program are to (a) stabilize wages so
as to curtail increasing production costs, as well as to limit increasing
purchasing power and thereby restrain the demands for the fewer goods
and services available, (b) assure uninterrupted production free from
labor disputes and encourage increased productivity, and (c) aid in the
better utilization of civilian manpower for production goals, including
the stabilization of employment and the prevention of manpower raiding.
It is quite obvious that all of these price and wage program objec-
tives are not mutually compatible. Even within either the price or wage
programs the objectives are not wholly harmonious. Any wage increase,
for example, unless wholly offset by increasing productivity and declin-
ing unit costs, is a cost increase and also an expansion of purchasing
power Only in the most dire national disaster can wage stabilization be
reasonably expected to be a wage freeze. Under any other circumstances
such a freeze would certainly interfere with the other wage program
objectives of production and increased productivity. Hence, the wage
program objectives are necessarily directed more toward restricting the
full effect of labor's bargaining power than in prohibiting any wage and
purchasing power increase.
Similarly, in the price program, previous cost-price relationships can-
not be maintained with unchanging price levels in the face of rising labor
costs, increased imported material costs, or higher unit costs due to pro-
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duction limitation orders. Likewise, this program cannot be attuned to a
price freeze but rather needs to be one of maintaining as stable a price level
as possible without unduly affecting reasonable profit margins.
The question to which this study is directed concerns the compatibil-
ity of objectives of the price and wage programs and the degree to which
they can be coordinated. After recognizing the general proposition that
in a price-wage spiral the former cannot effectively and fairly be re-
strained generally without similarly restraining wages, this question
arises: What are some of the areas of incompatibility between a price
and wage program which must be coordinated by an Economic Stabiliza-
tion Administrator? Perhaps most significant are such friction points as:
(1) The timing of controls. Is it necessary to impose (or withdraw)
wage controls in all areas where price regulations are imposed (or re-
moved) ? If labor is under a long term contract in an industry in which
price control is needed, need wage stabilization be imposed simultaneously
with the imposition of a price ceiling? If price control is no longer
necessary in an industry, should wage stabilization regulations be lifted
simultaneously regardless of the effect on other industries ?
(2) The degree of intensity of control. Granting that equity be-
tween the major segments of the economy is desired, what are the "fair
and equitable" price and wage levels? More specifically, if cost-of-living
wage increases are approvable in wage stabilization, should these wage
costs be passed on in higher prices or should they be absorbed and, if so, to
what degree? How does one equate the standards required for "hard-
ship" wage relief to those regarding "hardship" financial positions for
an industry seeking a price increase? When does a wage (or price) in-
crease, granted to settle a supply or production problem in an important
defense industry, become generally incompatible with price (or wage)
programs ?
Since these problems are the grist for the economic stabilizer's mill
in attempting to coordinate and keep comparable the price and wage pro-
grams, it is most significant to understand the major factors affecting
these questions as well as the power and authority which he has in in-
fluencing their resolution. It is perhaps all too obvious to note that a
stabilization administrator in our economic, political, and social environ-
ment is not unfettered by institutional factors in resolving these problems.
First, of course, are the legislative and legal requirements of a
control authority act which may simplify or intensify the administrator's
problem. The statute may require the concurrent institution of price and
wage controls in an industry or an area of the economy or forbid selective
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controls, thus eliminating a series of price-wage questions but raising
others. On the other hand, the act may require special treatment for one
area of the economy (e.g., agricultural prices) and thereby impose other
problems in determining fairness of price and wage regulations. Where
different levels of stringency are established, equity requires the treat-
ment of all segments of the economy on a "most favored nation" basis,
thus tending to relax the intensity of controls to the level of the least strin-
gent. Furthermore, a lack of legislative authority outside of direct price
and wage control can force some price and wage control decisions which
otherwise might not be necessary. For example, subsidy authority for
high-cost production or for imports and quota control of beef slaughter-
ing, which in themselves are not price control powers, hold the key to
effective price control in particular areas.
Secondly, there must be recognition of administrative limitations
which may be specifically prescribed in the enabling act or by executive
order. Tripartitism, which appears to have become the accepted adminis-
trative form of wage stabilization, imposes perhaps the most severe
administrative restriction on an economic stabilizer's freedom of decision
in coordinating price-wage questions. A tripartite wage board, with or
without dispute-settling functions, requires some freedom of decision.
This has necessarily included latitude to approve wage increases which
are "unstabilizing" to the price program if the board deems it necessary.
A tripartite board is not the only administratively restrictive factor.
The "get going" time inherent in the establishment of a controls program,
in terms of obtaining personnel and space, limits certain price-wage deci-
sions as does the mere fact of the immensity and unwieldly structure of a
general price and wage control agency. Most decisions or standards can
only be revised upward; controls cannot easily be put on or taken off;
and the coordinating of programs must necessarily be done in a rough-cut
manner.
Thirdly, institutional economic factors limit some coordinating de-
cisions. The dissimilarity of industry and union organization circum-
scribes the resolution of some issues. General Motors, for example,
manufactures products ranging from aircraft motors to refrigerators and
automobiles. On the other hand, the United Automobile Workers, while
perhaps representing the greatest number of GM employees, is far from
the sole bargaining agent at GM and does not limit its organization to
auto workers alone. Heterogeneity of industrial, agricultural, and
union organization forces the conciliation of price and wage programs
to be of a less precise nature than might theoretically be desired. This
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institutional unlikeness interlocks wage and price decisions in one area
with wage and price problems elsewhere and thereby limits the amount of
freedom of decision or integrating and coordinating activity which might
otherwise be desirable.
Fourthly, the balance of power between the political representatives
of the major economic groups prescribes or limits the area of activity of
a stabilization administrator. In part, this is merely an extension of the
first point since the balance of political forces shapes the enabling legisla-
tion. But beyond this, an administrator must recognize that certain
alternatives for aligning the price and wage programs are politically
just not viable.
Fifthly, the most basic of all the limiting factors is the general sense
of national support for the direct controls program. The attitude of all
groups toward the need for the direct controls basically determines the
general atmosphere and hence the loyalty of groups to the program re-
quirements. In time of full war this loyalty differs from times of peace
or cold war. A direct controls program requires individuals and groups
to restrain themselves or be restrained short of goals or objectives which
they might otherwise attain. The worker's wages are limited to some-
thing less than his employer is willing to pay him; the retail store or
business establishment is limited from charging that which its customers
are willing to pay; all economic groups are burdened with forms, red-
tape, and regulations; freedom of decision and action is limited. These
costs represent sacrifices. If the public does not agree with the need for
them, if the military action or the necessity for the defense program is
not firmly understood, if the knowledge or fear of the alternatives to
regulation is not a real factor, then the restrictions of either the price
or the wage programs will be either sabotaged or become meaningless
from lack of active support. The emergency and the controls program
must have some real meaning to a major industry for it to absorb in-
creased costs or for a union to accept a wage settlement consistent with
stabilization but which is less than it believes it deserves.
What then is the economic stabilization administrator's role in co-
ordinating the price and wage programs if the factors affecting co-
ordination are so largely predetermined? Does he have and can he per-
form any coordinating function? If so, what is that role and how can it
best be performed? After reviewing the history of the price-wage co-
ordination during 1950-1953 and making some comparisons with World
War II, some answers to these questions can be framed.
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II. PRICE AND WAGE COORDINATION WHILE INSTITUTING
CONTROLS-1950-1951
A. Coordination Provisions of the Defense Production Act of 195o
The provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950 which were
most pertinent to the questions of coordination of the price and wage
programs were those dealing with the organizational structure for direct
controls (Section 403), the parallelism requirement of price and wage
controls (Section 402(b)), and the legislative criteria for the control of
prices and wages (Section 402(c) (d)).
Organizational Structure
In 1950 Congress gave little attention to the coordinating role of
the Economic Stabilization Administrator over his constituent agencies.
Not until 1952, after the steel settlement, did this become a real issue. In
establishing a single independent agency with jurisdiction over price and
wage control, Congress was less concerned with the effect which this
would have on close coordination of price-wage policy than it was with
the administrative advantages of efficiency.2 An independent agency
was desired since it would represent only a temporary venture rather
than a permanent system of controls and would attract better personnel.
The Senate Committee report on S.3936 did note that an "independent
agency would assure proper coordination of the various aspects of this
vast program" which delegation to various agencies could not guarantee.3
The House bill did not contain a comparable provision nor did the Con-
ference Committee report give any further indication of legislative intent
on this issue.' The final provision of the Act (Section 403), establishing
an independent agency, gave greater emphasis to when such an agency
should be established than to the coordination it should attempt to achieve.5
Parallelism of Price and Wage Control Action
The issues concerning the timing of controls-whether there could
be selective price and wage regulations and the parallelism of price-wage
2. Compare Hearings Before The Senate Committee On Banking And Currency On
S. 3936, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1950).
3. SEN. REP. No. 2251, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950).
4. CONFERENCE CO.-AlMrrEE REPORT No. 3042, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1950).
5. Defense Production Act of 1950, Section 403, provides in part: "At such time
as the President determines that it is necessary to impose price and wage controls generally
over a substantial part of the national economy, he will administer such controls and
rationing . . . through a new independent agency for such a purpose. Such agency
may utilize the services, information, and facilities of other agencies and departments of
Government, but such agency shall not delegate enforcement of any of the controls
to be administered under this section to any other agency or department."
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actions-were major points of Congressional debate in August 1950, and
legislative intent was quite clear. The bills reported out of the Senate
and House Committees both provided a three-step procedure for the
institution of price and wage restrictions: first, a system of voluntary
controls; second, a system of selective price and wage regulations, and
third, a system of general price and wage controls. These bills, as intro-
duced by Senator Maybank and Congressman Spence, allowed consider-
able flexibility in the institution of controls, but administrative discretion
was severely limited during enactment.
In its report on the original bill, the Senate Committee noted that
"the degree of wage control required must in a general way parallel the
degree of price control imposed upon the economy. At the very mini-
mum, there must be sufficient wage control to protect established price
control, and to deal equitably with those establishments whose operations
are subject to price control. Broad price control, particularly when it is
sufficiently widespread to require application at the retail level, calls for
broad wage control. Price and wage control must go together in the
interest of equity to both employer and employee."'  While the Senate
Committee felt that wage controls might well be necessary to protect
price controls, it nonetheless did not believe that the former need be in-
stituted automatically when selective price ceilings were established. The
Committee report noted that the bill "authorizes the President to impose
selective wage control following the imposition of selective price control"
but that the "President shall impose wage controls where wage increases
would require increases in established price ceilings that would impose
undue burden on sellers operating under established price ceilings." 7
Furthermore, the Committee noted that "while the general parallel-
ism of price and wage controls has been prescribed, it is not the intention
of the Committee that price and wage controls should be thought of as
co-extensive in all cases. There will be occasions when one needs to be
applied without the other."8  The Committee recommended certain ex-
emptions from price control, such as newspapers and motion pictures,
without parallel exemption for wages in the same industries.
The emphasis on selective controls was also evident in a separate
statement appended to Senate Report 2250 made by Senators Fulbright,
Douglas, and Flanders, who declared that direct price and wage regula-
tions and rationing treat the symptoms of inflation rather than the disease
itself. Emphasizing that the primary need for combating inflation should
6. SEN. REP. No. 2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1950).
7. Id. at 30. (emphasis added).
8. Ibid.
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be the coordinated use of proper monetary, credit, and fiscal policies, these
Senators supported an amendment which would have restrained the Presi-
dent from imposing general price and wage controls until the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index rose 6 percent above the level of
June 15, 1950. In the interim, they felt that the President should have
the power to impose selective controls but that he should use this authority
only where an exceptional rise in prices threatened to interfere with the
national defense or threatened to disrupt other programs for controlling
inflation.
On the floor of both the House and the Senate, selective price and
wage control-the second step in the original bills-met opposition,
particularly from Congressman Kunkel and Senators Taft and Bricker.
It was argued that selective restrictions would be unworkable and dis-
criminated against the employee whose wages might be totally controlled
but who must purchase some goods which were not.9 If regulation is
needed, it was contended, "we must regulate the whole thing."'" "The
whole productive system and price system of our economy throughout the
country is so intricate, so involved, and so interconnected that immediately
price control is put on one commodity or one segment of the economy,
immediately it is necessary to put it on some other [making it] impractical
and impossible . . . to administer selective price controls.""
Although the House and Senate amendments, in effect, prohibited
any flexibility in the intermediate step of selective price and wage controls,
the compromise provision of the bill (Section 402(b)) as it came out of
the Conference Committee was not quite as restrictive. It specified that
if voluntary programs and agreements were found by the President to be
ineffective, he was authorized to issue selective price ceilings but was re-
quired concurrently to issue regulations stabilizing wages. Such selective
action could be taken when the President found, with respect to any in-
dividual material or service, that the price had risen or threatened to rise
unreasonably above prices prevailing on May 24-June 24, 1950; that the
increase would materially affect the cost of living or national defense;
and that such ceilings were needed to effectuate the purposes of the Act,
were practical and feasible, and would be fair and equitable. It was
further provided that when price ceilings had been established on ma-
terials and services comprising a substantial part of all sales at retail, the
President was required to impose ceilings on prices and services generally
9. See remarks of Congressman Kunkel, 96 CONG. REC. 12117 (1950). See also
the proceedings when the Kunkel Amendment was passed. Id. at 12219.
10. Senator Taft. 96 CONG. REC. 12269 (1950).
11. Senator Bricker. 96 CONG. REc. 12893 (1950).
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and to establish general wage stabilization. Furthermore, when selective
controls were established, the President was prohibited from increasing
wages in that industry which would require an increase in price ceilings
or impose hardship or inequities on sellers operating under the price
ceilings.
Price and Wage Criteria
The legislative history of Section 402 indicates that Congress was
concerned more with the timing of the institution of price and wage
controls than with their stringency and relative levels. Most price and
wage control criteria prescribed by the Act were extremely vague and
gave the President wide authority and discretion. However, there were
specific requirements limiting price regulations for agricultural com-
modities, which when taken with the general mandate of fairness and
equity did, in fact, limit the President to far less stringent controls than
might otherwise have been desired.
The declaration of general purposes in Title IV-price and wage
stabilization-provided little guidance for the administrator. It called
for preserving the value of the national currency; assuring that defense
appropriations were not dissipated; stabilizing the costs of living for
consumers and the costs of production for farmers and businessmen;
eliminating and preventing speculation; and protecting consumers and
wage earners, investors, and persons living on fixed or limited incomes
from undue impairment of their living standards. Congress declared
that price and wage stabilization was also to prevent economic disturb-
ances, labor disputes, or other interferences with effective mobilization
and to assist in maintaining a reasonable balance between purchasing
power and the supply of consumer goods and services.
There were more specific criteria but even then quite vague. Con-
gress directed the President, when establishing price ceilings, to give due
consideration to the May 24-June 24, 1950, period. This interval was
recognized by Congress as the most recent period unaffected by the eco-
nomic consequences of the Korean War. The President was merely
advised to give proper weight to the production objectives of the Act and
such relevant factors as he might determine to be of general applicability,
including speculative fluctuations, general increases or decreases in cost
of production, distribution, transportation, and fluctuations in profits
subsequent to June 24, 1950. Furthermore, the Act required that price
ceilings must be "generally fair and equitable."'12 Congress was most re-
12. Defense Production Act of 1950, §402(c).
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luctant to grant price and wage authority not limited by definite standards
but also recognized the dangers of placing too many restrictions on the
exercise of such authority. The Senate Committee considered many for-
mulae of an automatic character but in each instance wisely concluded that
more general criteria and a wider delegation of authority was preferred. 3
Wage stabilization, Congress decided, was needed not only to re-
strain rising wage costs but to limit purchasing power and the pressures
resulting from increased demand. Congress specifically used the term
"stabilizing wages" rather than the words "freeze" or "ceilings" since it
wished to control rates of pay rather than income. There was also recog-
nition that rigid wage stabilization would create gross inequities and
defeat the purpose of the Act. The Snate Committee, for example,
specifically approved the desirability of flexibility by observing the need
for incentive wage increases. 4
Section 402 (d) of the Act provided that no wage, salary, or other
compensation could be stabilized at less than that paid during the May 24-
June 24, 1950, period. The only other wage legislative mandate was
that no wage regulation should be issued inconsistent with the provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Labor Management Relations Act,
or any other law of the United States or any state.
Not so vague were the criteria for agricultural price ceilings. Ba-
sically, it was required that such prices could not be established below
either (a) the parity price, (b) the highest price received by producers
during the May 24-June 24, 1950, period, or (c) a price determined by
the Secretary of Agriculture in the event that the commodity was not
actively marketed during the May-June period. In addition, specific
restrictions were established for tobacco and fluid milk, essentially limit-
ing price ceilings to no lower than a special parity level. Furthermore,
Section 402(d) (3) prescribed other legal minima on agricultural com-
modity prices by requiring that no ceilings on goods processed substan-
tially from agricultural commodities be set at levels which would reflect
to the farmer less than a parity or a May 24-June 24, 1950, price and
that these ceilings allow for a fair processing margin.
In this manner Congress established a moving floor on agricultural
price ceilings that severely limited control over rising food prices.'" The
13. SEN. REP. No. 2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1950).
14. Id. at 31.
15. This "moving floor" also had an escalation device within its own mechanism
since about one-third of the commodities in the prices-paid index of the parity formula
were themselves subject to parity. Hence with their price rise, the prices-paid index and
the parity index rose. With parity index rising, the legal ceiling for these commodities
rose, allowing these commodities to reach new heights and thus start the cycle again.
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fact that food prices accounted at that time for approximately one third
of the weight of the BLS Consumer Price Index and were only under
limited'price control naturally affected the stringency of wage stabiliza-
tion regulations. But the effect on wage stabilization policy was greater
than the increased food bill to workers. By tying agricultural price
control to parity, the concept of automatic escalation was written into
law and was quickly used by the labor unions as an argument that at the
very least the maintenance of real earnings was an essential criterion of
equitable wage stabilization policy.
There was, however, even further protection for the farmer in the
Act's agricultural price provisions. The President was directed to adjust
price ceilings, never less than parity, to "make appropriate allowances
for substantial reduction in merchantable crop yields, unusual increases
in costs of production, and other factors which result from hazards oc-
curring in connection with the production and marketing of such agri-
cultural commodities."' 6
B. Structure of Coordination as Established
The first Economic Stabilization Administrator was not appointed
until October 7, 1950, but the framework and some of the limitations on
the coordinating function were established in the provisions of the Act
and by Executive Order before the Administrator's arrival. On Sep-
tember 9, 1950, the day after he signed the Defense Production Act, the
President issued Executive Order 10161," delegating authority given
him under the Act. This created the Economic Stabilization Agency and
assigned to the Administrator the task of "preserving and maintaining the
stabilization of the economy." Specifically, as a portion of his responsi-
bilities, the Administrator was authorized to "plan and develop both short
and long-range price and wage stabilization policies and measures and
create the necessary organization for their administration" and to "estab-
lish price ceilings and stabilize wages and salaries where necessary."
Despite what appears to have been a Congressional intent of creating
a single agency handling both prices and wages, the President visualized
the ESA as an agency which, while coordinating stabilization programs
with other mobilization agencies and giving direction to price and wage
programs, would nevertheless delegate most, if not all, of its operating
functions. The President, by Executive Order 10161, established a
Director of Price Stabilization in ESA (although he did not establish
an Office of Price Stabilization) to be appointed by the President and
16. Defense Production Act of 1950, §402(d) (3).
17. 15 FED. REG. 6105 (1950).
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perform such functions as determined by the Economic Stabilization
Administrator. Similarly, the President established a nine-man tri-
partite Wage Stabilization Board appointed by the President with the
task of "making recommendations to the Administrator regarding the
planning and development of wage stabilization policy" and such other
functions as "determined by the Administrator after consultation with
the Board."
There appear to have been various influences in the Executive Of-
fice which contributed to the creation of this organizational structure. It
resembled closely, of course, the final World War II relationship between
the Office of Economic Stabilization and OPA and NWLB. In addition
it is reported that both Dr. John R. Steelman and David Stowe of the
White House staff emphasized the need of a tripartite wage board as a
necessary device for securing labor and industry cooperation.'" They
are also reported to have stressed the importance of delegating to the
Board a wide measure of discretion, within broad policy lines established
by the Administrator, and to have cautioned that if the Administrator
did not accept the Board's recommendations it would lose support and
become impotent. 9 Another influential force on the organizational
structure established by the Executive Order undoubtedly came from
several OPA officials who had been advising Chairman Symington of
the NSRB on price control matters.2" In fact, some of the wording of
the Executive Order is almost identical to a memorandum that this
group presented to Symington on September 7, 1950, outlining recom-
mended action on economic stabilization. These men looked upon the
Economic Stabilization Administrator as symbolizing in the public mind
the Government's responsibility for stabilization and as having appro-
priate over-all functions; but they recommended that a price director be
appointed to operate under the Administrator's general guidance.
By the time Alan Valentine took office in October, the organizational
lines within which the coordinating function would have to operate were
fairly well cast. A tripartite wage board alone required substantial dele-
gation of authority for its operation. The fact that wage board members
and the Director of Price Stabilization were to be Presidential appointees
18. Marvin H. Bernstein, Administrative History of the Economic Stabilization
Agency Under Administrator Alai Valentine: September 9, 195o-January (9, 195r,
9 (manuscript, ODM files, 1951).
19. This timidity is reflected in Executive Order 10161, which authorizes the
Economic Stabilization Administrator to establish the additional function of the
Director of Price Stabilization but to establish the additional functions of the WSB only
"after consultation with the Board."
20. This group included James F. Brownlee, Henry H. Hart, Jr., Donald H. Wallace,
David Ginsburg, David Cavers, Stephen Ailes, and Dean McNeil.
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confirmed by the Senate meant that these individuals, rather than being
administrative hirelings, would be public figures having independent
stature outside of the authority delegated to the Economic Stabilization
Administrator. The fact that, until December 1952, the White House
chose members of the Board without the Administrator's prior consent
substantiated their independence.
Valentine chose to resist what appears to have been the organizational
pattern established by Executive Order 10161 and throughout his term
as Administrator insisted on a tightly held ESA control over price and
wage action as well as policy. In this he was unsuccessful. When Eric
Johnston succeeded Valentine, he recognized the necessity for broader
delegation.
Valentine conceived of the Economic Stabilization Agency as a
tightly integrated, unitary organization both on the national and regional
levels. He conceived of regional offices as "little ESAs" with "little
Valentines" reporting directly to him and having price and wage authority,
including enforcement, information, and other operations. On the organi-
zational question Valentine had greater problems with the Wage Board,
in pressing his position, than he had with the Director of Price Stabiliza-
tion (his differences with the latter took another form). Valentine
regarded the Board strictly in the literal terms of the Executive Order as
a group which "shall make recommendations to the Administrator." He
feared, for example, that the WSB was considering itself too much of an
operating body when in December it recommended that its membership
be increased from nine to eighteen in order to function more effectively.
As late as the beginning of January he was struggling with the question:
"To what extent should the actual administration be done by individuals
appointed by and directly responsible to the Administrator or to what
extent should these individuals be responsible and controlled by the
tripartite board ?21
With good reason, Valentine was attempting the near impossible of
holding a tripartite board in close rein as an advisory group. He feared
that once a delegation of authority was given, either as to policy or opera-
tion, he would never again have sufficient control over the wage program
to keep it within his concepts of economic stabilization and compatible
with the price program. His fears were far from academic. The United
Labor Policy Committee (organized to represent the joint position of the
AFL, CIO, and the International Association of Machinists in the
21. Letter, Valentine to Senator Maybank, Jan. 3, 1951, ESA files.
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mobilization effort), smarting under the administrative requirement of
an advisory WSB with administrative review of policy, wrote the Presi-
dent in December, 1950:
Wage stabilization is subject to needlessly cumbersome
machinery. As now provided, wage policy must first be recom-
mended by a Board representative of labor, industry and the
public. The recommendations of this Board are then subject to
the arbitrary decisions of a single individual. This makes ex-
peditious and just action impossible.
Review by a single top administrator, chosen for his gen-
eral administrative experience rather than specific competence
in the wage field, adds nothing to the process of wage stabiliza-
tion excepting uncertainty, procrastination, and arbitrariness.
Wage stabilization procedures should be revised so that the
wage stabilization board is given the status and authority to
make decisions on matters within its jurisdiction.22
In January, when hearings were called by the WSB to aid it in
planning wage policy, Harry C. Bates, a labor representative of the
Board, asserted that "the workers of this country will never agree for
one man to exercise influence over 40 million people with power to set
wages and prices. I don't want it, . . . [but] that you have . . . today."
Lambert Miller, testifying for the National Association of Manufac-
turers, in response to Bates, noted that while the Administrator could
"tip over" WSB determinations, he believed that the Administrator
would be "almost bound to accept . . . any fair and equitable policy that
is developed." To this statement Emil Rieve, a labor member of the
Board, said "whatever it is, we are not depending upon any one individual
to set the wages of workers."2
Although Valentine, on January 2, 1951, issued a general order dele-
gating to the Director of Price Stabilization all the functions with respect
to price stabilization which were delegated to him by Executive Order
10161 "subject to such general supervision, direction, and control as the
Administrator deems expedient,"24 he never granted similar functions to
the WSB. Not until January 24, 1951, when Johnston redelegated the
price authority, was the WSB granted power with identical language.25
22. United Labor Policy Committee statement to President, Dec. 20, 1950. Also
given in testimony by A. J. Hayes before WSB Hearings, Jan. 11, 1951.
23. Hearings before WSB, Jan. 10, 1951.
24. ESA General Order No. 1, Jan. 2, 1951, 16 FED. REG. 100 (1951).
25. ESA General Order Nos. 2 and 3, Jan. 24, 1951, 16 FED. REG. 738-739 (1951).
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Thus, the important limitations on the coordinating function of the
Economic Stabilization Administrator were firmly established prior to
his appointment. The law, in its strict parallelism requirements and its
loose agricultural price control provisions, and the Executive Order with
its establishment of a tripartite board imposed severe restrictions on the
degree of administrative coordination. But there were, in addition,
other serious limitations.
C. Economic Environment and Attitudes to Controls,
June 1r95o-January 1951
In the first half of 1950 our economy was making rapid strides in
recovering from the 1949 dip. From January to June industrial produc-
tion had risen sharply to the highest post-war level. Unemployment had
declined from over seven to about five percent of the total civilian labor
force, and corporate profits before taxes in the second quarter of 1950
were at the annual rate of $37.4 billion-about $10 billion over the 1949
average. Wages were rising, and prices were recovering from the 1949
declines.
With little slack in the economy, the inflationary pressures unleashed
by the advent of the Korean war took immediate effect. Unlike 1939
and 1940, little industrial equipment was not in service, and only about
one sixth of our labor force was unemployed. Even more important,
there were the recent memories of price rises and shortages of World
War II. Consumers and businessmen remembered having been caught
short, having to replace inventories at higher prices, doing without wash-
ing machines and automobiles for the duration, and not seeing prices
decline to 1939 levels after the war was over. Businessmen and con-
sumers rushed to buy.
Industrial production advanced 10 percent in the last half of 1950
but could not keep up with increased demands. Business expenditures for
plant and equipment rose 25 percent between June and December, while
business inventories increased from $54 to $62 billion. The buying wave
was made possible by sharply rising incomes and profits, large liquid
assets, and a willingness to borrow. Consumer credit outstanding by the
end of 1950 was at the all time high of $20 billion-compared to the level
of $17 billion in May, 1950. Similarly, commercial bank loans rose to
record heights, and the rate of bank deposit turnover increased signifi-
cantly.
In July, 1950, the Council of Economic Advisers summed up their
appraisal by noting that "we are faced with an over-all economic situation
which is essentially strong although threatened by considerable general
inflationary pressure, coupled with intense and rising pressures in limited
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areas.""-  The Council was most concerned with the inflationary impact
in areas of the economy where increased military expenditures would
be particularly felt. Shortages in steel and steel scrap, copper, aluminum,
zinc, lumber, and rubber concerned them. The Council was conservative,
and the members were probably better economists than social psychologists.
While the impact of the defense program did have effect in the areas they
mentioned, the anticipated impact of the program by businessmen and
consumers created, by far, the greatest pressures. When prices started to
rise, these anticipations heightened, demands increased, prices rose, and
the cost of goods and services climbed.
Prices, as usual, were still a function of supply and demand, yet
were primarily governed by the demand factor, which in turn appears
to have been largely correlated with military reverses and successes.
Immediately after the outbreak of war in Korea, prices jumped sharply
in July and August. Imported raw materials rose 10.2 and 14.7 per-
cent, respectively, in these two months while the Wholesale Price Index
rose 2.8 and 2.1 percent and the Consumers Price Index increased 1.1
and 0.8 percent.2 7 With the military successes in Korea toward the end
of the summer and the Inchon Landing, price increases lessened as fears
of full scale war subsided somewhat. In fact, in October, 1950, a slight
plateau of prices was temporarily established, and the spot market price
index actually declined.
This leveling off of inflationary presures was important to the
thinking being done regarding the institution of price controls. With
26. Midyear Economic Report of the President 9 (1950).
27. Monthly Price Changes June 1950-March 1951
Percent Change from Previous Month*
Spot Market Index**
Import Domestic Wholesale Consumer
Commodities Commodities Price Index Price Index
195o June 2.2 2.0 .06 0.5
July 10.2 7.4 2.8 1.1
August 14.7 5.2 2.1 0.8
September 6.4 7.1 1.8 0.7
October -0.6 -2.3 0.6 0.6
November 6.9 5.3 1.5 0.5
December 1.9 4.5 2.6 1.3
x 951 January 10.9 5.7 2.6 1.6
February 2.8 1.2 1.3 1.2
March -5.4 3.9 .0 0.4
Percent Increase:
June 1950-
Sept. 1950 34.5 21.0 6.9 2.6
June 1950-
Feb. 1951 66.0 39.3 16.3 8.0
* Computed from BLS price indexes.
•* Mid-month quotations used.
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continued military successes and a relatively small defense program, why
should not Valentine, who had just taken office, assume that the infla-
tionary buying spree was over; that only the indirect controls should be
applied; and that selective price and wage controls (and certainly general
direct controls) should be withheld until it was proved that the indirect
means were not sufficiently effective? While concern for the problem
was heightened by October, the predominant thought among economists,
both within and without of government, was to utilize fiscal, credit, and
monetary authority with the belief that only selective controls in some
particular areas of the economy might be necessary."8
With the Chinese intervention and military reverses in November,
demands became whipped into a new frenzy, and prices started another
rapid rise during December and January. By the time the general controls
were imposed at the end of January, prices of imported raw materials
had risen 66 percent, wholesale prices 16.3 percent, and retail prices 8.0
percent over June, 1950, levels. Not only had they risen spectacularly, but
they had, by the end of January, 1951, advanced unevenly with most of
the increase in wholesale prices yet to be felt as a push against costs and
prices at the retail level.29
Wage movements, although stickier, moved upward at a rapid pace
in the last half of 1950. During the first half of 1950, wage rates started
rising from the 1949 plateau. Before Korea they were generally mod-
erate with emphasis on fringe and small wage adjustments. The most
important development was the General Motors' settlement in May of a
five-year contract with automatic cost-of-living adjustment (1 cent in-
crease for each 1.4 point increase in CPI), annual productivity increase
of 4 cents, and greatly improved pension and social insurance benefits.
The pattern of wage increases in the first half of the year was between
5 and 7 cents an hour.3"
Starting in August and September, a veritable landslide of rapid and
sizeable increases occurred. September settlements in the automotive
industry were around 10 cents, while in October a pattern of about 12
cents was established by the aircraft, rubber, electrical, and aluminum
workers, with more workers covered by automatic cost of living and
28. Compare "Economists' Statement on Anti-Inflationary Measures," signed by
some 400 economists and submitted to the Joint Committee on The Economic Report,
November 30, 1950. (Printed in General Credit Control, Debt Management, and Economic
Mobilization (Materials prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report by
the staff, released January 29, 1951.))
29. See table, supra note 27. It will be noted that most of the price rise on imports,
and almost half of the wholesale price rise, occurred prior to the enactment of the
Defense Production Act in September, 1950.
30. Daily Labor Reporter, Bureau of National Affairs, Jan. 4, 1951.
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annual improvement clauses. Although wage rates and hourly earnings
increased swiftly in the last half of 1950, they rose less rapidly than did
prices. But their actual and prospective increase boosted general demand
and pressure on costs. In the midst of these price and wage movements,
the Economic Stabilization Administrator began developing coordinated
controls.
Government Attitude and Action, Fall 1950
Immediately after being appointed in October, 1950, Valentine
strove valiantly to assemble a staff although he was not convinced that
a full-scale price and wage control program would be required. He be-
lieved that if indirect controls were used vigorously enough, "we may be
able to avoid the greater complexity and difficulty of over-all price and
wage control, or at least hold these down to workable proportions."'"
Within the government, greatest pressures for the institution of
price control came from the military. In October, Secretary Marshall
noted that cost increases since the previous March represented a 9 percent
($1.5 billion) loss in equipment and that the stockpile objective would
cost another $500 million. While Secretary Sawyer believed general
price and wage controls should be invoked, Harriman urged greater re-
liance on indirect controls, believing direct controls would be only of
limited value if indirect controls did not first take their "bite." Valentine's
position was close to Harriman's, and they both reflected the general
position of the Committee for Economic Development.3 2
The Economic Adviser to Valentine, G. Griffith Johnson, has noted
that "the real policy position in the fall of 1950 was whether the problem
was sufficiently serious or of sufficient prospective duration to justify
resort to direct controls." W\ith the leveling off of prices in October, he
said, "the prospective problem as then assessed, in view of the slow de-
velopment and limited size of the future military impact, appeared to be
within magnitudes which could be handled by other [than direct price
and wage control] measures." 3
There was at this time, however, serious consideration given to the
use of direct controls, but some rather peculiar interpretations of the
Act regarding the use of selective regulations were in vogue. Symington,
then Chairman of the NSRB, incorrectly assumed in October that the
Act did not make wage controls mandatory if price restrictions were put
31. U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 20, 1950, p. 29.
32. See Minutes, Meetings Nos. 10 and 11, NSRB, Sept. 29, 1950, and Oct. 20, 1950.
33. Johnson, Reflections on a Year of Price Controls, 42 AmER. EcoN. REv. 289,
290 (1952).
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into effect. 4 Furthermore, Valentine in retrospect had said that he
interpreted the Act in October, 1950, to mean that there could be no
price-wage freeze until a substantial portion of the economy had been
brought under selective control. He has further noted that the President
agreed with him. However, the Act required that there be a general
freeze if a substantial part of all sales at retail affecting the cost of living
were under control. Selective controls were not first required by the Act.35
There was no unanimity of opinion in government regarding the
institution of regulations even two weeks after the Chinese intervention.
On December 13 at an Interagency Controls Coordinating Committee
meeting, Keyserling, representing the Council of Economic Advisers,
recommended more stringent limitations on credit and housing and stated
that "we -hould move on price and wage controls as rapidly as possible."
Keyserling was favoring, at that time, selective controls while Clark, an-
other member of the Council, supported general controls. At this meet-
ing Commerce and NPA were backing general price and wage controls
as soon as possible, while the Munitions Board and the Federal Reserve
Board favored starting with selective controls. HHFA, Agriculture, and
Labor noted public pressure but feared action prior to ability to administer
controls, and State, Interior, Treasury, and GSA were without a formu-
lated position. 6 In short, there was great hesitancy in government to
recommend an across-the-board freeze in prices and wages, with most
agencies holding opinions favoring selective intervention.
Despite the lack of general agreement either on the use of selective
or general price or wage controls, Valentine proceeded as rapidly as he
felt he could, utilizing the voluntary approach to stem the inflationary
tide. While spending much of his time recruiting a staff, he tried to gain
public support by issuing voluntary standards which would give the busi-
ness and labor world some notion of what was expected of them, and
simultaneously pleading, requesting, and threatening groups to cooperate
with these standards.
Coordination of price and wage policy during December, 1950, con-
sisted essentially of getting an organization in both areas, announcing
price and attempting to announce wage standards, and complying with
the law regarding concurrent action when issuing selective controls.
The Wage Stabilization Board was sworn in on November 28, 1950,
and had before it a request from Valentine to Cyrus Ching, its Chairman,
34. Compare Minutes, Meeting No. 11, NSRB, Oct. 20, 1950.
35. See letter, Valentine to Ross Shearer, ESA files.
36. Minutes, Meeting No. 9, Interagency Controls Coordinating Committee, Dec.
13, 1950.
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dated November 20, asking for an outline of a voluntary program for
wage stabilization. On December 18, Valentine made public a statement
from the Wage Stabilization Board which, instead of outlining a volun-
tary wage stabilization program, merely described the place of wage
policy in the general task of preventing inflation. It called for an 18-step
attack against inflation, maintaining that direct controls by themselves
"will conceal and defer its effects, while permitting a pressure of hidden
spending power to build up." Thus, it suggested five measures to in-
crease the volume of essential production, another five measures to mini-
mize the volume of money and credit in circulation, and eight other
measures to control specific areas of the economy, one of which was
"stabilization of wages, salaries and other compensation." Wage and
salary control have a definite and essential part to play, it claimed, and
the WSB "will do all in its power to perform its stabilization functions."3
This statement approached the question asked of them by Valentine
but went no further. While a useful declaration, which might better
have been developed as an ESA rather than a WSB declaration, it was
certainly of no use in establishing guides to wage negotiations. It gave
neither management nor labor any idea of the wage policy principles or
the levels of wage rates which the government might expect of them.
On the following day, December 19, specific and relatively severe
pricing standards for business and industry were issued by ESA request-
ing nation wide compliance "so as to avoid the necessity of further
mandatory controls."3 Any price increases after December 1, 1950, the
announcement read, would be "subject to action by the Agency at the
earliest feasible time" if they exceeded the stated criteria. These were:
1. A manufacturer could not raise prices if. his net dollar
profits before taxes were equal to or in excess of before-tax
profits in 1946-1949 period, except if,
2. An individual product or service was not profitable,
price could be increased but by no more than (a) the amount
necessary to make it profitable or (b) the amount of the in-
crease in direct wages and materials going into the product,
whichever was lower.
3. A wholesaler or retailer could not increase gross mar-
gins above those of June, 1950, if he was in the position de-
scribed in paragraph one, and furthermore he could not raise
prices on the basis of higher replacement or marketing costs but
37. Press Release, ESA-GPR-16, Dec. 18, 1950.
38. Press Release, ESA-GPR-21, Dec. 19, 1950.
INDIANA LA W JO URNAL
was required to add only his margin to inventory costs actually
paid.
The Agency concurrently served notice that any official action
henceforth would make use of a base period not later than December 1,
1950; certain basic materials would be rolled back in price to allow
maintenance of December 1 levels at later stages of manufacture; and,
therefore, no seller would derive any advantage from exceeding the
standards. A comparable stop-gap standard for wage stabilization at
that time might have prohibited wage increases exceeding the percentage
increase of the consumers price index from a pre-Korea date to December
1, 1950, with some exception for hardship. Such a standard was not
forthcoming. However, it was far more necessary, at the time, to get
price criteria established than wage criteria since prices were far more
volatile.
The ESA in the first weeks of December was attempting to hold the
December 1 price line by voluntary agreements in the basic industrial
raw materials of the economy as well as preparing to move in with
mandatory controls at that level-and at the next stages of manufacturing
if necessary. General control over prices and wages might later be neces-
sary, but starting with a voluntary program appeared more reasonable
and was the method that had been employed in 1940-1941.
Steel and Automobile Actions
In November ESA sidestepped meeting the steel price and wage
increase head-on. Informal discussions were held with Mr. Fairless and
other industry leaders directed toward the goal of voluntarily limiting
the price increase which was being proposed with the wage settlement.
Valentine, Ching, and Johnson believed that these might be effective, and
furthermore, they believed that their position at that time was not favor-
able to win a fight with the steel industry. At the conclusion of their
discussions and after a price increase averaging $5 a ton, ESA officials
believed they had achieved a victory in that the price increase had been
made more modest. The steel industry said that the price rise covered
only the increase in wages granted and not the material and other cost
increases incurred since the start of the Korean War39 and that a volun-
tary agreement with ESA was reached to hold steel prices at this level.
This was considered a victory by ESA in spite of the fact that it also
39. When estimating the price increase due the steel industry under the Capehart
Amendment in late 1951, there was evidence that the November, 1950, price increase
averaged more than the announced $5.00 a ton and that it was more than sufficient to
cover wage and other cost increases prior to December 1, 1950.
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represented a pass-through of cost regardless of earnings and was, there-
fore, not consistent with the price standards established a few weeks later.
Not so easily handled was the automobile price increase in December.
In late fall of 1950 the automobile industry was preparing to price the
new 1951 models. With the exception of the year 1946, the industry as
a whole had been operating at immensely profitable levels in the post
war years, averaging in 1947-1949 a return of 48.3 percent on net worth
before taxes and 27.5 percent after taxes. In the third quarter of 1950,
profits were at a far higher level-72 percent of net worth before taxes
and 34.4 percent after taxes."0 The major companies had maintained
prices during the year and were facing increased wage and material costs
with the additional prospect of having production decreased substantially.
This cut back was expected at that time to be in the magnitude of 30
to 60 percent.
In October, Henry Ford II wrote Valentine that the Ford Motor
Company was introducing its first 1951 model (the Mercury) without
an increase in the suggested list price, stating that "we want to be sure
that we are doing our part in holding the line against inflation." He
added, however, "how long we can hold this line, we don't know."'" In
the first week of December, both Ford and General Motors announced
price increases of from five to seven percent on their new models. On
December 7, Valentine requested Ford and General Motors to suspend
all announced price increases pending a meeting in Washington on De-
cember 13 of the whole industry. This they refused to do.
ESA had no desire to start its mandatory controls with a fabricated
product like autos, while the raw material and labor costs going into the
product were still uncontrolled. Although considerable stability was be-
ing achieved in December through voluntary agreements in many basic
materials, there was little success in holding the December 1st price line in
various important elements of automobile costs such as textiles or rubber.
While the big three automobile producers, accounting for about 90 percent
of total output, were operating at very profitable levels, the other eight
companies were not so fortunate, and two of these were actually operating
at a loss. In addition, there was the prospective cut back of production.
ESA was on the spot. The automobile industry, perhaps the most
representative to the public as "American industry," was flagrantly chal-
lenging the stabilization effort of holding a December 1 line and forcing
40. Compiled from SEC data. This excludes Ford Motor Company which does
not publish financial statements. There is reason to believe, -however, that the Ford
profits were most favorable too.
41. Letter, Henry Ford II to Valentine, Oct. 24, 1950, ESA files.
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the ESA to action. The industry not only represented $10 billion of
retail sales but by reason of its size was a leader in formulating wage and
price policy; hence the incident had a widespread psychological impact
on the business world. Furthermore, autos, next to bread, represented
the largest single element of cost in the Consumer Price Index, represent-
ing 2.5 percent of the index and about 5 percent of the part subject to
control by ESA.
The ten major automobile companies meeting with ESA in Washing-
ton on December 13 refused to forego price increases and maintain the
December 1 level until there was time to examine the situation. There-
fore, Valentine requested Ching, in compliance with Section 402(b) (3)
of the Act, to have the Wage Board prepare a proposed automobile wage
regulation and directed his staff to develop Ceiling Price Regulation 1.
Despite the fact that Ford rescinded its price increases on December 17,
CPR 1 was issued on December 18, fixing ceiling prices of new passenger
automobiles at the December 1 level for a period until March 1, 1951. In
the price order Valentine noted that the parallelism requirement of Sec-
tion 402 (b) (3) was being complied with and wages would be stabilized
as soon as possible.42
The arguments and the rationale of the industry, the unions, and the
Wage Board in the process of establishing the price and wage auto regu-
lations were indicative of the pressing stabilization problems and helped
formulate the price-wage policy pattern. Most of these positions were
given at a hearing held by the WSB on December 20 to consider wages
in the industry. In issuing invitations to the hearing, Ching said, "the
calling of this meeting must not be construed in any manner to assume
action as a result of the [December 13] meeting. . . . [However] we
cannot avoid the conclusion that some kind of controls either voluntary
or compulsory are in the realm of possibility."4
The labor position, expressed through Walter Reuther and others,
was that no long-range wage policy should be recommended by the
WSB until every union was heard, and no restrictive policy similar to
the Little Steel formula should even be considered. Reuther specifically
noted that no greater stability could be achieved than that already pro-
vided for under the GM 5-year escalator and improvement factor con-
tract and that any attempts to tamper with the contract would frustrate
the aims of the Act, destroy incentive, cause unrest, create labor-manage-
ment strife, and certainly would not achieve the goal of maximum
production.
42. CPR No. 1, Dec. 18, 1950, 15 FED. REG. 9061 (1950).
43. Telegram issued by Ching to major automobile manufacturers and leaders of
unions in their plants, Dec. 14, 1950.
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Management in the automobile industry, represented primarily by
Ford (Theodore 0. Yntema and John F. Bugas), maintained that a
formula for stabilization was needed since the alternative was arbitrary
ad hoc action with price and wage adjustments resulting in distortions,
inequities, and lack of production. They considered the voluntary pricing
standards unfair since those who had cooperated with the government
had been penalized while those who had raised prices before December 1
had been condoned, and furthermore, they contended that the standard
was unfairly restrictive. Yntema, who was to become a close advisor to
Eric Johnston the following month, presented a formula for prices and
wages. The present cost-of-living contract with annual improvement
factor, he asserted, offered the basis of maximum production and in-
dustrial peace. To go with this wage contract, price adjustments should
be permitted to cover (1) cost increases in wages, salaries, materials, and
services since the May 24-June 24, 1950, base, (2) a major part, perhaps
75 percent, of increased costs resulting from government forced reduc-
tions in production volume below 65 percent of production rate in the
first half of 1950, (3) design cost changes both upward and downward,
and (4) relief for hardship cases. He stoutly maintained, however, that
no formula was possible without a roll-back of excessive price increases
already made, without bringing food and farm commodity prices under
control, without increasing tax payments to a pay-as-we-go basis, and
without effective credit control.
The future development of wage-price policy followed closely most
of the major elements of the formula Yntema outlined, both as to
wages and prices. Was it because the formula was attuned to the tempo
of the time and also represented the amount of sacrifice that responsible
unions and management would go along with?
On December 22, Valentine adopted the automotive industry find-
ings and recommendations of the WSB and issued Wage Stabilization
Regulation No. 1, which froze the current collective bargaining agree-
ments in the new passenger car industry and the established wage and
salary schedules until March 1, 1951. Except for compliance with the
parallelism requirement of the law, the order was largely unnecessary.
The WSB found that there were no contemplated general wage or salary
changes for those covered by this regulation, and the principal collective
bargaining agreements provided for no increases until mid-March.
Furthermore, the necessity of issuing an order was a cause for embarrass-
ment. The Board was not ready to issue a general wage policy and took
pains to explain that the regulation had no implications regarding the
eventual approval or disapproval of established wage programs and prac-
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tices, including both cost-of-living and productivity. The Board explained
that "the formulation and development of a wage stabilization policy in
the new passenger car industry, in related industries, and in industry
generally, require careful study and review. . . . A single industry or a
portion thereof cannot serve as the broad base upon which wage stabiliza-
tion precedents are founded. The implications of such precedents to other
industries, employers and employees must be thoroughly explored. .... ""
No further mandatory price or wage actions were taken in December,
but informal meetings continued at a rapid pace. Leading producers in
the oil, steel, copper, lead, zinc, metal scrap, meatpacking, sulphur, and
aluminum industries were called to Washington to discuss means of
voluntary cooperation. In addition, some 230 major business firms 5
were sent telegrams requesting their cooperation in combating inflation
and asking them to notify ESA at least seven days prior to making a
price increase on any standard product or product line with annual sales
over $500,000.
Public Attitude
In response to the President's speech on December 16, proclaiming
a state of national emergency and emphasizing the necessity of cooperation
with the stabilization effort, an avalanche of mail was received at the
White House from many walks of life, asking for the immediate imposi-
tion of controls to protect consumers, fixed income groups, and small
businesses. While there undoubtedly was general public support for
mandatory price and wage controls "for the other guy, to protect me,"
business communities in most sectors were cooperating only niggardly
with the voluntary program, as evidenced by the continued and rapid price
advances in December and January. The attitude of labor was no better.
These views regarding the function of direct controls in the emergency
environment of the time are well demonstrated by testimony presented at
hearings before the WSB on January 10 and 11, 1951.
The National Association of Manufacturers' evaluation of the need
of controls was expressed by Ira Mosher: "It is management's funda-
mental position that competitive enterprise works best and most efficiently
in the absence of controls. . . . The main reliance in the fight against
inflation should be in the direction of appropriate fiscal and credit
measures, supplemented by allocation and priority controls, where neces-
sary, rather than price and wage controls. . . . However, if prices are to
be controlled, then obviously all of the elements that enter into cost should
44. WSR No. 1, Dec. 22, 1950, 15 FED. REG. 9326 (1950).
45. Selected by criteria of sales volume. The largest 500 firms were first listed,
and then certain industries with which ESA had direct contact (e.g., automobile and
steel) were excluded.
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also be controlled. Accordingly, we reluctantly come to the conclusion
that wage stabilization is a necessary concomitant to price control... [L] a-
bor policy should not be accompanied by a demand for no strike pledge
from labor and for a no lock-out pledge from management. . . . Both
labor and management can be assumed to act with full appreciation of the
responsibility that the emergency imposes on them, unless actual experi-
ence demonstrates otherwise."4 6
Also from the business world, Marion Folsom, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Committee for Economic Development, empha-
sized that efforts to increase civilian production along with the strictest
measures in the way of taxes, savings, and credit should be the policy
rather than over-all price and wage control which "is not going to enable
anybody to buy more because it will not result in any increase in produc-
tion." Fred Lazarus, of the CED and Federated Department Stores,
supported Folsom and added: "I do not believe it can be stressed too
often as to how different the present condition is as against World War
II when everybody believed that these other things [price and wage
controls] were so necessary. . . . The burden of proof, I believe, ought
to be on the necessity of the imposition of controls.'M
Organized labor took up the theme that increased production and
not "restrictive controls" were needed. To them stabilization meant
stabilization of production, and that meant increasing productivity and
better labor-management relations. Labor believed that wage stabiliza-
tion should supplement but not supplant the collective bargaining process.
Their attitude toward the stringency of wage regulations was in large part
influenced by the lack of control which the government had over prices and
profits. Labor's rationale was that first, prices had to be controlled and
then, wages could be stabilized; but since prices could not be controlled,
wage stabilization should be loose or nonexistent. The United Labor
Policy Committee maintained that wage stabilization must allow for
higher costs of living, correction of inequities,48 and improvement factor
increases. It also stressed that all current contractual agreements should
be honored regardless of provisions for wage increases. In short, wage
46. Testimony of Ira Mosher, NAM, WSB Hearings, Jan. 10, 1951 (emphasis
added).
47. Testimony of Fred Lazarus, WSB Hearings, Jan. 11, 1951.
48. Some of the inequities particularly referred to included: inequities because of
time with reference to contract expiration dates, catch up with the "pattern," and depressed
industries; inequities which were related to the growth of companies in which wages
had not caught up with its prosperity; industries newly organized; inter-plant and inter-
area inequities; wage rate changes arising from promotions, reclassification, merit in-
creases, adjustments of rate structures, or other intraplant practices; and increases
resulting from health, welfare, retirement, and other benefit plans. Statement to Presi-
dent Truman, Dec. 20, 1950; reissued for WSB Hearings, Jan. 1951.
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stabilization to the ULPC meant governmental approval of current con-
tracts and all "reasonable" demands.4"
Neither management nor labor was willing to accept the meaning of
the Presidential proclamation of a state of emergency and make sacrifices
by limiting economic gains otherwise obtainable. Management and labor
were concerned with the approximate one percent average monthly rise
in retail prices and labor costs and the two percent average monthly rise
in wholesale prices-but not to the degree of changing their advocacy of
strictly peace time procedures. The fact that it was quite obvious that
tax, credit, and monetary measures were not being made sufficiently
effective, that the stringent actions in indirect controls, while desirable,
would not be forthcoming, and that public confidence in future stabiliza-
tion of prices and wages was shattered did not affect the attitudes ex-
pressed. Their rationale seemed to be that this was not a war and direct
controls were therefore too harsh-in spite of the wage-price spiral
which was whirling about them. With this sentiment a no-strike, no-
lockout policy freely accepted by labor and management was obviously
not to be expected.
Coordination of price-wage policies implies that both are, to a degree,
malleable. If they are rigid and predetermined by law, basic attitudes,
and the resultant of administrative organization, coordination becomes
a meaningless rationale, with the coordinator attempting to prove to the
public that all is stable and equitable as he rides Roman-style astride his
two "horses." In 1950 the degree of flexibility of price and wage policies
was severely restricted by our society as they expressed a lack of concern
for the defense and economic problems of the day.
49. As usual, there was little doubt left as to where John L. Lewis stood regarding
the imposition of controls. He said:
It obviously is impossible to freeze wages with any degree of even claimed
equity as long as the price structure is, in a governmental sense, uncontrollable.
And obviously, now you have a price structure which is less controllable in every
practical and academic sense than even the price structure which was sought
to be controlled by the government during World War II.
• . . [T]he suggestion of freezing wages in this country on the theory that
prices will be frozen concurrently is impractical, cannot be done in any satis-
factory sense, and should not now be undertaken. . . . Of course, if it comes
to the time that grave and immediate peril affects our country, there is no
American who in such a time would not yield obedience to any order, however
improper, which seems to be necessitated by immediate considerations, and do what
he can, regardless of the applicability. But that time obviously isn't here.
Officially we are not at war with China, and in the general sense of the word the
Korean situation is not a part of our longtime planning or the problem that
confronts your Board. Testimony of John L. Lewis, WSB Hearings, Jan. 10,
1951.
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D. The Price-Wage Freeze
During December and January, the knowledge that prices were not
being controlled and the fear that prices could not be stabilized sent buyers
into the market to stock up. They were met by sellers who confirmed
their fears. On top of the price rises motivated by these fears and
reactions were those motivated by the belief that price ceilings were in-
evitable and coming soon. This prompted sellers to disregard the volun-
tary standards and establish a higher price-one with which they could
live under a forthcoming freeze.
To DiSalle the picture was "so clear, the story so convincing, that
we cannot pause another moment. We cannot delay. . . . Each day's
delay means increasing prices and increasing inflationary pressures. Each
day's delay means greater drain on the resources of government and
growing hardship for the individual.""0  The Council of Economic Ad-
visers in mid-January advised the President that "it is more important
to put the brakes upon inflation than to get a perfect system of controls."'"
Valentine and most of his consultants seriously questioned the feasi-
bility of general controls, and they specifically doubted the ability of an
inadequate staff to cope with the monstrous problems which they would
raise. Valentine feared that the freeze would cause "a line from the
Temporary E Building of our office up to the Capitol and around a few
blocks waiting" 2 for something to be done about inequities." DiSalle's
proposal for a 30-day freeze added fuel to the inflationary fire as it leaked
to the press that such a plan was under consideration. Valentine was
forced to hold a press conference, with DiSalle present, on January 10,
explaining that he had rejected the 30-day freeze proposal after discus-
sions with Wilson and DiSalle and that the Agency was proceeding with
selective controls.
By mid-January most officials recognized that a freeze was required.
Timing was the only real remaining issue. Valentine was in substantial
agreement with DiSalle although forced to proclaim to the public that a
freeze was not being planned in an attempt to slow the price increases
which were being made in anticipation of a freeze order.
The major problems in the timing of the order were: (1) how to
stay as true as possible to the policy of holding the December 1, 1950,
50. Memorandum, DiSalle to Johnston, In Support of Recommendation for Im-
mediate General Price Control, Jan. 22, 1951, ESA files.
51. Memorandum, CEA to President Truman, Jan. 12, 1951.
52. Interview with Alan Valentine, U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 12, 1951,
p. 26.
53. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 34-35.
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line so as not to put at a disadvantage those who had cooperated with
the government, and (2) the dilemma that the longer the action was
delayed the greater the disparity among prices would be, while if roll-back
action was to be taken for some commodities, more time was required to
determine the level at which they should be established. The highest price
in the December 19-January 25 period was chosen, after some hectic dis-
cussion, as the best solution to the divergent objectives.
Although the freeze of prices and wages on January 26 was by defini-
tion "coordinated" action, it was primarily directed at establishing some
stability in the runaway price movement. In fact, the requirement of the
Act that action be taken in wages concurrently with that in prices was
one of the factors which influenced Valentine to delay a general price
control move. He had not, as yet, obtained any wage policy from the
Wage Stabilization Board, and he saw the requirement of freezing wages
with prices, which would immediately require a decision on escalator
clauses. Furthermore, Valentine recognized the difficulties of attempting
to prohibit such provisions but also believed that if controls were frozen
"with escalator clauses, then you really aren't controlling inflation at all,
so far as all those aspects of our economy where there are no escalator
clauses .... "5'
While this problem, under any circumstance, could not be avoided,
Valentine viewed it as a reason against an immediate freeze. Actually,
hesitation because of the escalator clause increased the magnitude of the
problem. However, it appears that this is just the effect which the
requirement for concurrent action had.
E. The Institution of Price and Wage Controls in World War II
The Defense Production Act enacted in September, 1950, in the
midst of rapidly rising prices and wages, implied and directed price-wage
coordination by requiring parallel action and establishing an Economic
Stabilization Agency. Full, yet restrictively prescribed, authority was
granted over prices and wages although it was not really used until the
general freeze in January, 1951. The legal authority was created, but
the support from organized labor and industry was largely lacking.
The institution of price and wage controls in World War II was
strikingly different. The movement of prices and wages in 1939-1941,
the legal framework of control, the approach to and relationship between
price and wage stabilization, made the attitude of affected groups vary
54. Inter'view with Alan Valentine, U. S. News and World Report, Jan. 12, 1951,
p. 25.
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sharply. During the two years from 1939-1941 the problem was quite
different, the approach was different, the results were fairly comparable.
Price and Wage Movements-1931-1941
Unlike the rapid upward movement of prices and wages in the eight
months following Korea, prices and wages remained relatively stable for
a year and a half after the outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1939.
During these eighteen months, the wholesale price index advanced only
7.5 percent and the consumer price index 2.2 percent. Wage rates rose
only 4.7 percent although gross hourly earnings advanced 9.8 percent
with the increase in production.5 Not until February, 1941, when many
industries were approaching capacity operations and unemployment was
greatly reduced, did prices and wages start rising sharply as increased
output only partially offset increased demand. By the fall of 1941, more
than two years after the outbreak of war, the price-wage pressures became
more serious as production of consumer goods began to decline while
military output and purchasing power advanced rapidly.
The rapid price-wage spiral did not occur immediately upon the
outbreak of war and while the pressure on prices came primarily from
increased demand, rather than rising costs, there was not the buying
hysteria which we witnessed in 1950. While direct labor costs per unit
of output increased in the early 193941 period, they were offset by sharp
reduction in unit overhead which accompanied the expansion of produc-
tive capacity. Prices and wages did not start their sharp upward climb
until mid-1941. 8
55. See Douty, Trends in Factory Wages, 1939-1943, 56 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 869
(1943). Douty, Development of Price-Wage Policies 111-115 (BLS Bulletin No. 1009,
1950).
56. Index of Wholesale and Consumer Prices, Average Hourly Earnings
and Estimated Wage Rates of Factory Production Workers, Selected
Months 1939-1941.*
Prices Gross Awerage Estinates**
Wholesale Consumer Hourly Earnings Wage Rates
1939 August 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
September 105.5 102.0 100.6 99.8
December 105.6 101.0 104.5 101.9
1940 March 104.5 101.2 105.3 102.9
June 103.3 101.9 106.1 103.4
September 104.0 101.8 106.3 102.9
December 106.7 102.1 108.3 103.4
1941 February 107.5 102.2 109.8 104.7
March 108.7 102.6 110.4 104.9
June 116.1 106.1 117.3 109.9
September 112.4 109.4 119.9 112.9
December 124.8 112.1 125.5 116.8
* August 1939 is used as a base of 100. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, BLS.
**Estimated from average hourly earnings to exclude overtime premium pay at
rate of one and a half after 40 hours. See Douty, Development of Price-Wage
Policies 113 (BLS Bulletin No. 1009, 1950).
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Organization and Authority
The delegation of authority to stabilize prices and wages in World
War II, and the organization accompanying it, developed haltingly in
Rooseveltian fashion as each new need presented itself. Unlike the De-
fense Production Act of 1950, passed within three months after the out-
break of war, the Emergency Price Control Bill was not enacted by
Congress until January, 1942, two and one half years after the commence-
ment of war in Europe." Not until October, 1942, a full three years
after the start of European hostilities and ten months subsequent to Pearl
Harbor, did Congress pass the Stabilization Act, providing authority over
prices and wages and establishing an organization to coordinate the two
programs."
Although there was a dissimilarity of timing as to the outbreak of
hostilities and passage of price control acts, it should be noted that in both
World War II and the Korean campaign Congress authorized wide regu-
lation over prices soon after American soldiers were actually fired upon
by the enemy. While that is not an adequate criterion for the need of
price control, perhaps such drastic action has been, and is, necessary for
Congress to enact a law restricting the free play of supply and demand. 9
Following Korea, price control efforts started with authority but no
prestige. In World War II there was some prestige but no authority.
Until January, 1942, there was no delegation of Congressional authority
to control prices, but Leon Henderson, operating as head of one of the
seven divisions of the National Defense Advisory Commission, was as-
signed to "watch prices, to advise the President, to talk with the leaders
of American industry, to get their individual consent, so far as pos-
sible . . . to [restrain] prices.""0
57. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. §§901 (1946).
58. 56 STAT. 765 (1942), 50 U.S.C. §§901 (1946).
59. In 1953 the Senate bill (S. 1081) for stop-gap price-wage authority was reported
from committee over the protests of Senators Bennett, Goldwater, and others, who
claimed that once the emergency was upon us Congress could delegate authority if
necessary. S. 1081, as it came from committee, provided that: "The President is authorized
and directed to freeze all prices and wages whenever he shall find and declare that a
grave national emergency exists and that exercise of such authority is necessary in the
interest of national security and economic stability." When S. 1081 got to the Senate
floor, Senator Byrd introduced an amendment, which was passed, restricting use of the
stop-gap freeze to "whenever the United States has declared war against a foreign
nation, or whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution" so directs, 99 CoNG. REc.
5260 (1953). In the debate on this issue, Senator Bricker claimed that a price-wage
freeze would not be feasible "unless there were an underlying sentiment supporting it,
which there is not at the present time, and which there will not be unless a dire
emergency is recognized by the Congress, and the country is practically in an all out
war." Id. at 5271. The House Banking and Currency Committee refused even to hold
hearings on the stop-gap price-wage authority, and no bill was forthcoming.
60. Testimony of Leon Henderson, Hearings Before The House Committee On
Banking And Currency On H.R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1941).
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No move was made to stabilize wages during 1940 or 1941. Sidney
Hillman's function on the NDAC was directed toward the prevention of
undesirable disputes that would interfere with the defense effort. On
March 19, 1941, the National Defense Mediation Board was established
by executive order; but this too was directed toward disputes and did not
mention wages or any principles of wage settlement. The Board mediated
individual cases "without any policy, not having any power, really, to
make a national policy on wages."'"
On the price front, in addition to talks with industrial leaders,
formal price chedules were issued, starting with the machine tool
industry in February, 1941. By July, 1941, 12 more schedules were
issued; another 33 were promulgated by the time of Pearl Harbor; and
between December 7, 1941, and the end of January, 1942, an additional
58 schedules were issued. The usefulness of informal methods of per-
suasion, warnings, and threats started to wear thin with the rising price
pressures during the summer of 1941. As in 1950, the greatest success
of this approach was with industries closely dominated by a very small
number of firms, but the needs of control extended beyond this group
of basic industries. The administration hoped that reasonable stability
could be achieved by controlling the price movement of the basic com-
modities-especially since it was quite dubious whether formal authority
could be obtained from Congress for anything else. In August, 1941,
hearings were initiated on the Emergency Price Control Bill. The pro-
posal, while providing for either selective or general price control, made
no provision for wage control. It merely established a policy for those
departments and agencies of government dealing with wages "to work
toward a stabilization of prices, fair and equitable wages, and cost of
production.61
2
While Bernard Baruch testified in favor of an over-all price-wage
freeze, including rents and farm prices at the parity level, and Representa-
tive Gore introduced a bill with these provisions, the Administration and
Congress separated wage stabilization from the price control measure.
Leon Henderson, who was most concerned with the inflationary dangers
of rising labor costs, nonetheless believed that wage stabilization should
not be tied administratively to price control and felt that voluntary wage
restraints would be most effective at that time. Isador Lubin, Commis-
sioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and White House confidant,
argued that wage control was unnecessary and undesirable. "If you
61. William H. Davis, Chairman, NDMB, Transcript, Executive War Labor Board,
Feb. 6, 1942, p. 45.
62. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. §901(a)
(1946).
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fix prices, you are automatically fixing a certain part of your wage struc-
ture."6 With prices fixed, employers offer stiff resistance in collective
bargaining to wage demands in order to protect their profits, he main-
tained. But furthermore, he contended that wage increases do not neces-
sarily increase labor costs, that wage ceilings may adversely affect output
and impede the shifting of workers to defense industries, that wage ceil-
ings would require profit ceilings, that collective bargaining contracts
stabilize wage rates during the contract period, and that administration of
wage structure would be an extraordinarily formidable task due to the
complexity of the American wage structure.6 4
Thus, unlike the Defense Production Act of 1950, there was no re-
quirement for parallel action in the Emergency Price Control Bill which
became law on January 31, 1942. Although the latter included no
authorization to regulate "compensation paid by an employer to any of
his employees," 65 a far more significant base for achieving wage stabiliza-
tion was developed before the bill was enacted. Ten days after Pearl
Harbor, a labor-managed conference was convened by the President,
and with patriotic vigor a no-strike, no-lockout pledge was made by the
parties to last for the duration of the war. With this agreement a po-
tentially effective cornerstone for wage stabilization was set in place. To
implement the understanding, the National War Labor Board was
created.66 The executive order establishing this agency, like that estab-
lishing the NDMB, made no reference to wages or wage stabilization
although it granted authority over wage issues in disputes within its juris-
diction. Voluntary wage settlements were outside of the NWLB's juris-
diction. It should be noted that in establishing the Board the President
gave no specific guidance as to wage stabilization policy in dispute cases;
the Board itself was to develop such a policy consistent with the times.
Attitude and Policy
By the time the Emergency Price Control Bill was enacted in
January, 1942, 105 price schedules had been issued, and during February,
March, and April, another 50 were promulgated, bringing about one-third
of all wholesale prices under ceilings. In the first quarter of 1942, the
OPA had come to recognize that the inflationary tide could not be halted
through use of fiscal powers and selective regulations. General control
over all prices appeared to be the only feasible move. The General Maxi-
mum Price Regulation was issued on April 28, 1942, freezing prices at
63. Hearings, supra note 60, at 1849.
64. Ibid.
65. See EXEC. ORDER No. 9017, Jan. 12, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 237 (1942).
66. Ibid.
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the March, 1942, level. The regulation became effective for manufactur-
ing and wholesalers on May 4, 1942, for retailers a week later, and for
services on July 1, 1942. There were minor exclusions from the order,
such as books, magazines, newspapers, and certain raw materials better
controlled at later stages of processing. But the basic inadequacy then
(as well as in 1951) was in the exclusion of agricultural commodities
from the freeze-as required by the Act. Prices of farm and food
products could not be brought under control until they had reached 110
percent of parity (later reduced to 100 percent in October, 1942).
OPA next attempted to iron out the inequities of the freeze and
to maintain the price line. Basic to a determination of the fairness of
price levels was the industry earnings standard which had been under
development, in the latter half of 1941 and 1942. The law required that
maximum prices be "generally fair and equitable," which OPA interpreted
as meaning that a reasonable level of industry earnings be protected. This
concept was translated into an earnings standard which assured a price
ceiling at least high enough to allow an industry, as a whole, aggregate
returns, before taxes, approximating those during a normal peacetime
period (1936-39) with adjustments made for changes in investment.
While this did not limit the profits a firm or an industry could make, it,
of course, did require absorption of costs as long as returns exceeded the
standard. The base period (1936-39) did not include "lush" profit years,
and hence the standard was a fairly rigorous one. There were other
standards existing and developed over the course of OPA's existence;
but basically, at the time of the freeze, there was a recognition of the
necessity of taking the price structure "as is" and attempting to hold the
line, requiring absorption of costs as long as profits were above the
industry earnings standard.
At the time of the general price freeze in April, 1942, the NWLB,
without authority to stabilize wages, was developing a wage policy in
the settlement of dispute cases coming before it. In the International
Harvester case, the Board spelled out some basic principles which it would
henceforth follow: Wages should be sufficiently high to enable workmen
to "maintain a standard of living compatible with health and decency,"
and real wage levels would be "reasonably protected." However, the
Board noted that labor should not expect upward changes in wage struc-
ture to keep pace with cost of living.6" In the early development of wage
policy, Chairman Chester Davis wrote the President that wages which
had achieved fair levels should, if possible, be maintained and that those
which were substandard should be allowed cost-of-living adjustments.
67. 1 WAR LAB. REP. 112 (1942).
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Thus, while OPA made a specific effort to hold the price level and struc-
ture, early wage policy encouraged the improvement of substandard wages.
Both price and wage standards were (by 1951 criteria) harsh, and
the President gave added solidity to this line in his April 27, 1942, speech
when he asserted that the "time has definitely come to stop the spiral.
And we can face the fact that there must be a drastic reduction in our
standard of living." Although the President noted that "due considera-
tion to inequities and the elimination of substandards of living" would
continue, "stabilization of the cost of living will mean that wages in
general can and should be kept at existing scales." The policy was more
specifically established on July 16, 1942, with the Little Steel decision,6"
which permitted wages to catch up with the 15 percent rise in living costs
which had occurred between January 1941 and May 1942, but prohibited
any further escalation.
These policies were only as meaningful as they were enforceable, and
during the summer of 1942, both the OPA and NWLB requested the
President for additional authority. The NWLB, having authority only
in dispute cases, was concerned over voluntary agreements which were
undermining its policy and outside of its jurisdiction. Henderson saw
the need of broader power to control wages, salaries, and farm prices.
The first week in September, the President sent a message to
Congress which read, in part: "It is impossible for the cost of living to
be stabilized while farm prices continue to rise. You cannot expect the
laborer to maintain a fixed wage level if everything he wears and eats
begins to go up drastically in price. On the other hand, it is impossible
to keep any prices stable-farm prices or other prices-if wage rates, one
of the most important elements in the cost of production, continue to
increase. . . . Therefore, I ask the Congress to pass legislation under
which the President would be specifically authorized to stabilize the cost
of living, including the price of all farm commodities. The purpose
should be to hold farm prices at parity, or at levels of a recent date,
whichever is higher. . . . At the same time that farm prices are stabilized,
wages can and will be stabilized also. This I will do."69
A month later the Stabilization Act of 1942 was enacted, directing
the President to issue a general order stabilizing prices, wages, and salaries
affecting the cost of living at the level of September 15, 1942, as far as
practicable. Authority over all wage rates was given to the NWLB, and
agricultural prices could be controlled at 100 percent of parity. Imme-
diately following passage of the Stabilization Act, the President created
68. 1 WAR LAB. REP. 325 (1942).
69. 77 CONG. REC. 7043 (1942).
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by Executive Order 9250 the Office of Economic Stabilization with
authority, subject to Presidential approval, to ". . . formulate and de-
velop a comprehensive national economic policy relating to the control of
civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing,
subsidies, and all related matters-all for the purpose of preventing
avoidable increases in the cost of living, cooperating in minimizing the
unnecessary migration of labor from one business, industry, or region
to another, and facilitating the prosecution of the war. To give effect to
this comprehensive national economic policy the Director [of Economic
Stabilization] shall have power to issue directives on policy to the Federal
departments and agencies concerned."7
F. Comparison with World War II Experience
Certain generalizations and conclusions regarding price-wage co-
ordination can be distilled out of a comparison of the recent controls
experience with that of World War I--despite the fact that the economic,
legal, organizational, and environmental factors were quite different.
Conclusions regarding the issue of parallelism can be made quite
positively. The requirement of parallel wage action when instituting
price control can be a deterrent factor to effective stabilization. Few, if
any, can take exception to the general theory upon which Congress based
the parallelism requirement, namely, that wages are an important element
of cost and that it is neither equitable nor generally feasible to control
prices and allow wages to increase indefinitely. But the issue must be
viewed more closely to see how blind allegiance to this general theory in
the institution of controls can, in fact, defeat the objective of effective
price-wage stabilization.
At the start of an emergency, prices are generally more volatile than
wages, moving in response to anticipated shortages, other price increases,
and speculation. Specific prices for goods and services in those areas of
the economy where the military impact is most directly felt, or expected
to be felt, rise more rapidly. Hence the need for control is first apparent
in prices. Furthermore, it is most necessary to hold the sensitive
prices as soon as possible by selectively directed controls since they con-
cern, by and large, our basic raw materials. If left free to rise, their
impact is felt cost-wise throughout the economy. It is also significant to
note that indirect economic controls can do little at halting these increases.
The need for selective price control thus certainly precedes the need for
general wage control. The time element- of this procedure is dependent
upon economic factors such as the degree of unemployment, the utilization
70. ExEc. ORDER No. 9250, Oct. 3, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 7871 (1942).
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of plant and equipment, and the source of the inflationary pressure-from
scare buying or the inflationary gap."
The significant point is that where selective price controls are called
for, they are needed prior to general wage controls. The comparison
must be between selective price and general wage controls since experience
has indicated that it is quite academic to even discuss selective wage con-
trols. Due to the heterogeneity of labor and industrial organization and
the interlocking relationships of wage rates, selective wage control appears
to be an interesting problem but an impossibility.
Therefore, if a strict parallelism requirement is prescribed by the
law, any administrator is faced with the dilemma of either imposing wage
controls prematurely (and thereby weakening stabilization) or delaying
the imposition of price controls. In the period after Korea, the parallelism
requirement tended to retard the imposition of selective price controls
and was also a delaying influence on the general freeze.
The effect of this parallelism requirement was not as serious in the
Korea experience as it would have been in the institution of price and
wage controls in World War II. With hindsight it is far more apparent
than it was at the time that had general price and wage controls been
imposed in the summer of 1950 many later problems could have been
avoided. Following Korea, there was not as great a time lag between the
start of price and wage increases. The need for across-the-board direct
controls came quickly. In 1940-1942, however, a tight wage-price paral-
lelism requirement would have forced premature wage controls, assuming
that the price action would have been taken as it was. It would have
been premature since, on equity grounds, wages generally could not and
should not have been held at the level existent when the first price action
was taken. Therefore, the wage stabilization standards, if established
concurrently with the price action, would undoubtedly have resulted in
an escalation wage policy. This would have been most difficult, if not
impossible, to limit at some later time-specifically, in 1942 when the
Little Steel formula was established. Starting with a loose wage policy
which could not be discarded would have eventually meant that the wage
71. When commenting on an early draft of this article, Mr. DiSalle observed:
"If our recent experience has proven anything, it has proven that calling a group in to
talk about either a voluntary program or a selective program merely feeds the almost
natural inclination of people to raise prices. After an over-all freeze, it might be possible
to enter into a great many voluntary agreements. These agreements would be desirable
from the standpoint of enforcement and eliminating the detail which so often bogs down
the operations of the control program. It might even be possible to exempt a great many
items after the freeze and have a selective controls program in reverse, but I just
cannot bring myself around to believe that the program would be possible without first
taking your over-all action." Letter, M. V. DiSalle to J. H. Kaufmann, June 17, 1953,
ODM files.
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level would have been higher than necessary and that price controls would
have had to have been relaxed.
Experience with the institution of regulations clearly indicates that
direct price and wage control legislation should not require absolute
parallelism in the institution of selective controls. It is equally clear,
however, that general wage stabilization is a basic requirement for general
price control, and, therefore, the authority to stabilize wages must be
provided when general price controls are established.
The malleability of both the price and wage programs at the time
of their institution is limited and affected by many factors outside the
control of an economic stabilization administrator. These factors largely
predetermine the level of price control, the stringency of wage stabiliza-
tion, and cannot easily, if at all, be affected or changed by an administrator
in his coordinating function. In both emergencies, for example, the parity
provisions of agricultural price control established limits to the level at
which prices could be contained and thereby affected the level at which
wages could be stabilized. Especially if the parity limitations on price
controls exists in the legislation without some counter factor, such as a
food subsidy program, will the level of stabilization and the malleability
of the coordination be largely predetermined. Furthermore, parity pro-
visions establish the scope of escalation in the stabilization program and
thus make it more difficult not to extend the escalation policy to other
segments of the economy.
While it is possible under certain circumstances to roll back individual
prices, it is virtually impossible to roll back either the price levels generally
or wage rates. An economic stabilization administrator in instituting
controls must, therefore, by necessity, take the general price and wage
level "as is." His problem is largely one of timing and strategy. He must
have assembled a price agency and obtained agreement with a tripartite
board. Since there is no predetermined and objective standard of equity
short of "recent normal experience," he must judge his timing shrewdly
so that his authority as specified by law, the degree of public support as
established by the general sense of urgency and appreciation of the need of
controls, and the relative and absolute levels of prices and wages which he
wishes to maintain are all in a happy balance.
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